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Abstract— In 2005, 30% of the Flemish farms faced 
a manure excess, while at aggregated level still 9.7% of 
the emission rights were unused. This means that, 
despite the various possibilities, Flemish farmers do not 
succeed in an effective exchange of manure between 
farms. In current paper is shown how inorganic 
fertilizer use influences the use and exchange of organic 
nitrogen. Because of the mutual interdependency 
between organic and inorganic nitrogen emission rights 
(or quota), inorganic nitrogen use limits the emission 
rights for organic nitrogen. Utilisation of these emission 
rights are analysed as a trade-offs choice between plant 
productivity (use of inorganic nitrogen) and manure 
disposal, as the major abatement alternative of manure 
production. Farmers still prefer inorganic fertilizers 
because of their effect on plant productivity and 
income. However, by changing the quota rent of 
organic nitrogen, the fertilization behaviour can be 
influenced. A higher quota rent of organic nitrogen 
would increase the use of manure. This trade-off 
behaviour seriously influences effectiveness of policies. 
When the objective is to lower the total nitrogen use, a 
mere reduction of organic quota can partially be 
counteracted by a higher inorganic nitrogen use. When 
the objective is to better spread the manure, increasing 
the quota rent for deficit farms will increase their 
acceptance of manure.  
  
Keywords— manure abatement, nutrient emission rights, 
Tobit model 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Since the 1960s, several West European countries, 
e.g. The Netherlands, Denmark, France and Belgium, 
faced a large expansion and intensification process in 
the livestock production (in particular pigs and 
poultry). In these regions, the growth in animal 
number was favoured by the proximity of ports [1]. 
In Flanders in 2005, for example, 5.789.931 pigs and 
26.949.252 units of poultry were reared [2]. An 
excess of nutrients resulted from the feed compounds 
trade balance and led to a high pressure on the 
environment [1]. As a result, surface and 
groundwater got polluted with nitrogen, because of 
denitrification, and phosphate leaching into the soil 
[3]. During 2005, the livestock sector in Flanders 
produced 157,991,110 kg of nitrogen and 60,111,081 
kg of phosphorus. Pig production accounted for 
37.1% of the total nitrogen production and 41.9% of 
the total phosphorus production. The poultry sector 
accounted for, respectively, 10.6% and 12.9% of the 
total Flemish nitrogen and phosphorus production 
[2]. The production of pigs and poultry is mostly 
concentrated in West Flanders (the westernmost 
province of Flanders), which borders on the North 
Sea. The ports of Zeebrugge and Ostend are situated 
in this province while the port of Ghent is adjacent. 
In this area, 54% of Flanders pigs and 37.5% of 
Flanders poultry are reared. Consequently, 40% of 
the total nitrogen production and 43% of the total 
phosphorus production is generated in this province.  
As a consequence of the Nitrate Directive 
(91/676/EEC)1, the Flemish region has introduced a 
manure decree in 1991, which describes how manure 
should be disposed. A limited amount of manure can 
be spread on the land according to the type of 
manure, crop category and land category. With this 
disposal constraint, the manure decree actually 
created a system of tradable emission rights [4]. In 
fact, land entails a right to spread manure and both 
land and manure are tradable between farms. In this 
manure exchange system, conceived as system of 
tradable emission rights, manure is labelled as the 
emission, whereas the right to spread manure on land 
is labelled as the emission right [5]. This labelling is 
justified because manure use, given the imperfect 
                                                          
1. 1 The main purpose of the directive was to protect the waters 
against pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources  
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incorporation of nutrient inputs into end products, 
jointly entails a nutrient emission. 
Flemish farms can react to the manure legislation 
as follows: 
• the farm adapts its animal production to 
produce less manure; 
• the farm chooses for abatement by obtaining 
sufficient emission rights or by end-of-pipe 
solutions such as manure processing. 
When regarding manure disposition on land as an 
abatement measure, manure is considered as a waste 
product rather then a product which contains valuable 
nutrients.  
On top of the regional concentration of animal 
production, agricultural development has led to a 
great differentiation between farms (specialised 
livestock farms, specialised arable farms and mixed 
farms) resulting in a concentration of manure 
production at farm level as well. Despite the various 
manure exchange possibilities provided in the 
manure legislation, a lot of farms do not succeed in 
an effective exchange. The reasons for this have 
hardly been examined, but [1] give at least one by 
showing, for the Dutch case, that arable farms 
consider manure as secondary choice to inorganic 
fertilizers.  
Inorganic fertilizers are preferred to manure 
because the latter has a high non-uniformity of 
nitrogen content, a relatively high nitrogen loss and 
thus less nitrogen available for immediate crop 
uptake [1]. According to [6] inorganic fertilizers are 
often used because of the direct available nitrogen. 
Evidence exists that using inorganic fertilizers has a 
significant positive effect on productivity of most 
crops. Because of these positive effects, farmers 
prefer to use  inorganic nitrogen. Because of the 
mutual interdependency between organic and 
inorganic nitrogen, however, the use of inorganic 
fertilizers limits the maximum dose of organic 
nitrogen, and thus the utilisation of emission rights of 
the latter. 
The aim of the study is to examine how the use of 
inorganic fertilizers can effect the use of organic 
nitrogen and how the link between both fertilization 
types can influence the effect of a policy change. For 
analysing the competition between inorganic 
fertilizers and manure use, a variable is defined that 
relates inorganic nitrogen use to remaining free 
fertilization room for inorganic nitrogen. This allows 
for an econometric estimation of the drivers for a 
given trade-off between manure abatement (emission 
right utilisation) and plant productivity. The study 
also aims at formulating a more effective regulation 
than the current major efforts of the Flemish 
government, which are not yet effective with respect 
to the Nitrate Directive. In spring 2006, 38.5% of the 
Flemish measure points exceeded the 50 mg nitrate 
per litre water standard [7]. The remainder of the 
paper is organised as follows. First, a short overview 
is given of the Flemish manure regulation and 
discussed from an emission right perspective. Section 
3 describes the data of observed substitution of 
inorganic and organic fertilisers and the 
methodology. In section 4 the results are given and 
interpreted. The paper ends with a conclusion. 
II. MANURE POLICY IN FLANDERS: SYSTEM OF 
EMISSION QUOTA 
Since 2000, the farmer must comply with four 
different nutrient emission rights: nitrogen from 
inorganic fertilizers, nitrogen from manure, total 
nitrogen and phosphorus. In this study, only nitrogen 
emission rights will be considered because they are 
the most important problem for water quality. The 
nitrogen use is restricted by two individual quota 
(organic and inorganic nitrogen) and one joint quota 
(total nitrogen). Because the sum of both individual 
quota is larger than the joint quota, the use of an 
individual quota can affect the other when the joint 
quota becomes binding (Fig.1). 
To describe the interaction between the three 
quota, we introduce the concept of free fertilization 
zone (FFZ). FFZ is the amount of one nitrogen type 
the farmer can apply without affecting the quota of 
the other type. FFZ is thus the part of the quotas that 
can be used without interaction with the other quota. 
The utilisation of the quota beyond the FFZ affects 
the possibility to use the quota of the other nitrogen 
type. A free fertilization zone (FFZ) can be 
delimitated for both individual quota: a free 
fertilization zone for organic nitrogen (FFZO) and a 
free fertilization zone for inorganic nitrogen (FFZI). 
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Based on the concept of FFZ, the variable 
‘limitation’ (LIM)  can describe how much the use of 
inorganic fertilizers limits the use of manure: 
LIM= ‘use of inorganic nitrogen’ –‘ free 
fertilization zone inorganic nitrogen’ 
 
In case of a usage of inorganic nitrogen exceeding 
the FFZI, a positive value of LIM shows how much 
the use of inorganic nitrogen reduces the available 
quota of organic nitrogen. A negative value of LIM 
indicates that the use of inorganic nitrogen does not 
affect the use of organic nitrogen. Since there is no 
difference for the farmer for different negative values 
for LIM, the negative values of the LIM is censored 
to the single value ‘0’. The values of FFZ and LIM 
depend on crops because the manure regulation 
subdivided crops into four different categories 
(grassland, corn, low nitrogen crops and other crops) 
and subsequent different fertilisation norms. The 
fertilization norms according to these categories in 
2003 are given in Table . 
III. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
A. Data 
The data base has been set up by the Flemish 
controlling administration: the Flemish land agency 
(FLA). It contains all variables related to production, 
transactions, acquisitions and use of nutrients for each 
Flemish farm individually. The database contains the 
complete population of 44,796 farms over a period of four 
years (2002-2005) with a total of 179,764 unbalanced 
panel observations. For the Tobit regression (see further), 
only farms with at least 0.5 hectare of land are selected, 
resulting in a sub sample of 137,987 unbalanced panel 
observations. Based on the number of hectares per crop 
category and the corresponding fertilization norms, the 
three different quotas are calculated. The production of 
nutrients (including nitrogen) per farm is calculated 
based on the number of animals per farm and the 
corresponding excretion norms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 *Only the fertilization norms for the general areas are 
given. More stringent norms are imposed for vulnerable 
areas (water, nature and phosphor saturated areas) 
**Crops with a low N demand, e.g. onions, chicory, 
clovers, fruit plantations, flowers,… 
***All crops not belonging to one of the 3 other 
categories, e.g. potatoes, sugar beets, cereals, legumes, … 
 
Total N 
organic N (manure + other) 
Inorganic N (Chemical) 
FFZI 
FFZO 
 
 
Fig.1 graphical representation of the Flemish emission quota system in the MAPIIbis regulation 
Table 1 The 2003 fertilization norms, in kg/ha (*), 
according to crop category 
Crop category P2O5 Total 
N 
Organic 
N 
In-
organic 
N 
Period 1/1/2001 until 
31/12/2002 
    
 Grassland 140 450 325 350 
 corn 120 275 275 150 
 Low N crops(**) 100 125 125 100 
 Other crops (***) 110 275 225 200 
Period 1/1/2003 until 
31/12/2006 
    
 Grassland 130 500 250 350 
 corn 100 275 250 150 
 Low N crops 100 125 125 100 
 Other crops 110 275 200 200 
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B. The Tobit model 
Given the censored variable ‘LIM’ a Tobit analysis is 
appropriate for analysing LIM as dependent variable [8]-[ 
12]. For a more elaborated description of the Tobit model, 
see e.g. [8][9] The model is specified as: 
 
 tixtit xy µβ +=*     (1) 
 
with 
 
*
tiit yy =   if  0
* >ity  and    
  0=ity     if  0
* ≤ity   
(with yit the limitation of farm i in year t) 
 
where the residuals, µ it are assumed to be independently 
and normally distributed. The new random variable, or the 
latent variable *ity  is unobserved if 0
* ≤ity . 
C. Explanatory variables 
Obviously, given its direct competition to organic 
fertilisers in providing crop nutrition, the first set of 
variables relates to inorganic fertiliser use. In most cases, 
the farmer applies a given amount of inorganic fertilisers 
because this provides the plant of immediately available 
nitrogen[6]. Also [1] indicate that farmers consider 
inorganic nitrogen superior to organic nitrogen. However, 
the positive effect of inorganic nitrogen varies among the 
different crops. Therefore we argue that inorganic nitrogen 
dose is driven by plant characteristics. This leads to the 
following main crops categories as explanatory variables: 
grassland, maize, low nitrogen demanding crops en other 
crops.  
A second variable indicates the change in manure policy 
and is indicated as ‘MAP’ (Manure Action Plan) and 
defined binary (2002=0; 2003-2005=1). This policy 
change has reduced the quota for organic nitrogen 
resulting in a higher FFZI. Again we argue that a higher 
FFZI leads to lower values of LIM.  
Next, manure use will be influenced by the local 
manure pressure. [13] have found that the degree of 
acceptance2 varies from almost 100% at manure producing 
farms to less than 55% at manure accepting farms. We 
argue that the degree of acceptance can be explained by 
the theory of quota rent [5][14]. These authors have found 
that in the case of sugar beet, dairy and manure quota, a 
                                                          
2. 2 Degree of acceptance : share of manure actually applied to a 
specific crop cultivated in a specific field from the theoretical 
amount of applied manure which maximizes crop yield [15] 
higher quota rent leads to a higher degree of quota 
utilisation. In the case of manure quota, the quota rent can 
be approximated by the regional manure pressure3. A 
larger manure pressure in the surrounding areas means 
more costs to discharge the (excess of) manure. Emission 
rights are fixed locally and, therefore, the manure must be 
transported over a longer distance before free emission 
rights can be found. Moreover, more transaction costs are 
made by searching over longer distance those farms who 
are willing to accept manure. As a result, in regions with a 
high manure pressure, under-use of the organic quota leads 
to higher extra costs, meaning that the quota rent of the 
quota for organic nitrogen is higher in these regions 
(because of the higher opportunity costs of not using the 
quota completely).  
Finally, a farm-depending variable is defined, indicating 
its status of manure offering or manure demanding agent. 
Farms that produce more organic nitrogen than their 
emission rights (surplus farms), will utilize their quota for 
organic nitrogen as much as possible (so that the excess of 
manure is as small as possible), resulting in a smaller 
limitation. Because of imperfect market conditions, the 
incentive of deficit farms to keep their quota of organic 
nitrogen maximal is lower. Because surplus farms can be 
expected to react more heavily on changing manure 
pressure, an interaction term with local manure pressure is 
added. , i.e. a higher manure pressure causes higher costs 
for surplus farms. Variables used in the Tobit regression 
are summarized in Table 2.  
The Tobit regression model then becomes: 
 
LIMit=Cit+ β1 grasslandit + β2 cornit + β3 sugar_beetit 
+ β4 LowNit + β5 otherit + β6 manure_pressureit + β7 
surplus_farmit+ β8 MAPit + β9 surplus_farmit* 
manure_pressureit +µ it    (2) 
 
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Table 3 and Table 4 show the data that characterises the 
manure problem in Flanders.    
 
 
 
                                                          
3. 3 The regional manure pressure is the dual variable of a linear 
normative programming model which describes the transport 
behaviour with fully exploitation of the emission rights of 
organic nitrogen [16] 
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Table 2 Variables used in the Tobit model 
Variable definition mean 
limitation (‘use of inorganic nitrogen’ –‘free 
fertilization zone inorganic 
nitrogen’)/ha 
6.689 
Grassland Share of grassland  at the farm 0.452 
Maize Share of maize at the farm 0.202 
LowN Share of low N crops at the farm 0.047 
Other Share of hectares of other crops at 
the farm 
0.175 
Manure 
pressure 
Proxy of manure pressure in the 
region of the farm 
0.846 
Surplus farm More production of organic 
nitrogen than emission rights 
No=0; Yes=1    
0.234 
MAP Change in manure policy: 2002=0; 
2003-2005=1 
0.799 
 
 
At aggregated level and with full utilization of the 
emission rights for organic nitrogen, Flanders would not 
face a manure problem, e.g. in 2005 9.7% of the total 
emission rights for organic nitrogen were not filled up 
(Table 3). But as some farmers choose to not fully use 
their emission rights for organic N, many manure 
producing farms cannot find enough disposal rights. 
Therefore, almost 30% of the Flemish farms had a manure 
surplus in 2005. On the other hand, almost 12% of the 
Flemish farms applied more inorganic fertilizers than their 
FFZI (Table 4). At aggregated level, the FFZI exceeded 
more than 3 million kg N. This is 14% of the total surplus 
of organic N in Flanders.  
The interaction mechanism supports the need for a 
detailed analysis of the possible contribution of inorganic 
fertiliser use to the problem. As explained earlier, the 
impact of inorganic fertiliser on the available organic 
manure quota is best described by the variable LIM. Table 
5 shows the results of a Tobit regression of the impact of 
farm characteristics and policy on the ‘limitation’-
behaviour.  
The magnitudes of the estimated coefficients from a 
Tobit model cannot be interpreted directly as slope 
coefficients (change in share with a unit change in an 
explanatory variable), however, their signs, significance 
and relative importance can be interpreted directly 
[17][18].  
The results confirm the hypothesis that the increasing 
quota rent of organic manure stimulates the utilisation of 
the organic manure quota leading to a lower limitation of 
the organic quota. This can be clearly seen when 
comparing Fig. 2 and Fig. 3. 
Fig. 2 gives the regional manure pressure for each 
Flemish municipality while Fig. 3 gives the share of the 
organic quota that is limited by the use of inorganic 
fertilizers. Looking at both figures it is clear that the higher 
the manure pressure is (i.e. the further away from an area 
with free emission rights) the less the limitations will be.  
The results also confirm the hypothesis that farms with 
an organic manure surplus make a significantly different 
trade-off between organic and inorganic manure. When 
more organic nitrogen is produced on the farm compared 
to the volume that can be disposed on the farm land 
(surplus_farm =1), the limitation is smaller.  
 
Table 4 Figures at aggregated level in Flanders for inorganic nitrogen and the interdependency between 
organic and inorganic nitrogen  (source: own calculations based on ALF-database) 
Year Total use of inorganic N 
(kg N) 
Farms with a positive 
limitation (%) 
Aggregated limitation in 
Flanders (kg N) 
Percentage of limitation of 
total manure surplus at 
surplus farms (%) 
2002 32,764,073 26.5 8,383,724 44.7 
2003 36,712,952 14.2 3,714,374 15.4 
2004 36,510,260 14.3 3,865,725 16.6 
2005 34,678,991 11.9 3,006,611 14.0 
 
 
 
Table 3 Figures at aggregated level in Flanders (source: own calculations based on ALF-database) 
year Total emission right 
of organic N (kg N) 
Total use of organic 
N 
(kg N)(*)(**) 
Not used emission 
rights organic N (kg 
N) 
Percentage of surplus 
farms (***) (%) 
Surplus of organic 
N in surplus farms   
(kg N) 
2002 179,676,241 145,560,232 34,116,009 25.8 18,754,737 
2003 144,783,638 135,259,729 9,523,909 36.2 23,978,308 
2004 144,546,765 133,547,520 10,999,245 31.4 23,208,290 
2005 142,596,948 128,720,995 13,875,953 29.3 21,540,764 
*the total use of organic N is the sum of the produced manure, the incoming manure and the purchased other organic 
materials (like compost, etc) reduced by the outgoing manure 
** figures about processing the manure at the farm itself are not known 
*** farms with an  excess of organic nitrogen 
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Table 5 Tobit model of limitation per hectare of land 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     C(1) -15.41702 1.682013 -9.165816 0.0000(***) 
Grassland -89.80413 1.973303 -45.50955 0.0000(***) 
Corn -10.15534 2.157982 -4.705941 0.0000(***) 
LowN 55.60214 2.415379 23.02005 0.0000(***) 
Other 21.51224 2.093373 10.27635 0.0000(***) 
MAP -40.44623 0.719933 -56.18057 0.0000(***) 
Manure_pressure -2.017080 0.053301 -37.84344 0.0000(***) 
Surplus_farm -48.58333 0.969191 -50.12772 0.0000(***) 
Surplus_farm*manure_pressure 1.922771 0.143121 13.43463 0.0000(***) 
Log-Likelihood function -166,012    
LLR test against intercept only (8 d.f.) -19,808 (***) 
Number of observations 137,987 
   
Mc-Fadden Pseudo R² 0.056 
   
*** indicates significance at alpha = 0.001 
 
 
totaal080318.proxy_mestdruk
0 - 0.06 
0.06 - 0.17
0.17 - 0.31
0.31 - 0.59
0.59 - 0.95
0.95- 1.34
1.34 - 1.78
 
Fig. 2 Regional manure pressure or quota  (expressed as the shadow price of quota restriction, in euro/ kg N) 
 
0 - 1.41
1.41 - 3.47
3.47 - 7.01
7.01 - 15.15
15.15 - 27.81
 
Fig. 3 share of the quota for organic nitrogen that is restricted by the use of inorganic fertilizers ( in %) 
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When, on the other hand, less nitrogen is produced on 
the farm compared to the volume that can be disposed on 
the farm, perfect market conditions would imply that the 
deficit farm would accept manure or sell manure emission 
rights. However, the results indicate that this perfect 
market assumption does not hold, probably due to 
transaction costs.  
Finally, the significant interaction term shows that 
surplus and deficit producers of organic nitrogen react 
differently on a changing manure pressure in the region. 
The sign is, however, the opposite of what one at first sight 
may expect. Surplus farms react less heavily on changing 
manure pressures than it is the case for deficit farms. 
Nevertheless growing manure pressure can be expected to 
lead to higher discharge costs at surplus farms, contrary to 
deficit farms which do not face these extra costs. The  
explanation can be found through looking more closely at 
the initial farm behaviour at a low manure pressure. To 
keep the discharge costs as low as possible, even with a 
low manure pressure, surplus farms will minimize the 
amount of manure that has to be transported or processed. 
Therefore the limitation of the organic quota on these 
farms will be rather small. Because of this already optimal 
categories with a very limited FFZI will lead to a lower 
limitation value. Increasing importance of grassland, 
which has the largest FFZI, in the total farm acreage will 
behaviour, changing manure pressure has a rather small 
impact on farm behaviour. However deficit farms do not 
act in an optimal way by a low manure pressure. A 
growing manure pressure leads to a higher amount the 
surplus farms is prepared to pay to farms which are willing 
to accept manure. Emission rights are becoming more 
valuable and this can incite deficit farms to dispose more 
emission rights and therefore to keep the limitation smaller 
than it is the case at a low manure pressure. Besides the 
quota rent, other aspects play a role as well. The positive 
effects of inorganic fertilizers make organic nitrogen 
inferior to inorganic nitrogen.  Farmers will always make 
use of inorganic fertilizers, even when this use could affect 
the emission rights of organic nitrogen. This becomes 
obvious, when looking more closely into the results. If 
farmers would give preference to organic nitrogen, the use 
of inorganic fertilizers would be limited by the FFZ of 
inorganic nitrogen (and thus limitations would be zero). 
Crop categories with a large FFZI have a negative impact 
on limitation while a greater share of crop lead to a smaller 
limitation. The LowN crops have no FFZI. 
An increasing importance of this category will lead to the 
largest positive effect on limitation. Corn and other crops 
have an intermediate FFZI, resulting in an intermediate 
effect on limitation. This indicates that the farmer’s 
behaviour is not influenced by the amount of inorganic 
nitrogen he can freely dispose without affecting the quota 
of organic nitrogen. Contrarily, he prefers the optimal use 
of inorganic nitrogen to the maximum use of organic 
nitrogen. 
In 2003, the manure policy has changed, resulting in 
more stringent quota for organic nitrogen. This change in 
policy has led to significant smaller limitations. The more 
rigid quota for organic nitrogen lead to a larger FFZI. 
Farmers can apply more inorganic fertilizers without 
affecting their quota for organic nitrogen. In Table 4 is 
shown that indeed the use of inorganic fertilizers has 
increased but the limitation at the same time has decreased. 
Also the application of organic N has decreased because of 
the policy change (table 3).  
This result weakens the previous statement that optimal 
use of inorganic nitrogen is superior to the maximum use 
of organic nitrogen. The farmer makes a trade-off between 
optimal use of inorganic nitrogen and using as much 
organic nitrogen as possible. When FFZI is low, the 
optimal use of inorganic nitrogen lies above the FFZI. If 
the use of inorganic nitrogen were optimal, the use would 
not change by changing FFZI. However, when FFZI 
raises, the optimal use of inorganic nitrogen will increase 
as well but, as the decreasing LIM values indicate not as 
much as the FFZI does.  
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of current paper was to analyse the interaction 
between both nitrogen types and the impact of the use of 
inorganic fertilizers on the Flemish manure surplus. The 
rationale behind this was the ineffective exchange of 
manure, even with sufficient disposal possibilities at the 
regional level. By means of a Tobit panel model we have 
estimated the trade-off made at farm level between 
maximum utilisation of available organic nitrogen quota 
for manure abatement and the need to use inorganic 
nitrogen fertilizer for optimum plant productivity. 
Results show that farmers still prefer inorganic nitrogen, 
which confirm earlier findings of [1] that for farmers the 
use of inorganic nitrogen is superior to the use of organic 
nitrogen. In addition to the Feinerman and Komen 
findings, our results show that the superiority of inorganic 
nitrogen is driven by maximisation of crop yields but this 
can be traded off by other economic motivations. Crop 
yields are positively affected by applying inorganic 
manure. The intensity of the effect can vary among 
different crops. Based on the crop characteristics the 
farmer will set an optimal use of inorganic nitrogen. On 
the other hand, for the sector as a whole it is important to 
dispose manure in the most cost-friendly way, meaning to 
dispose manure as much as possible on the available land 
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(while avoiding processing costs). Because of the 
imperfect market conditions on the emission rights market, 
the farmer will base his trade-off choices on farm-level 
conditions rather than on theoretical regional-level 
considerations. So, economic conditions at farm level will 
definitely play a part as well.  
The observed inorganic fertilizer use is below the 
optimal use of inorganic nitrogen. This suboptimal use is 
due to the trade-off considerations made by farmers. The 
farmers would increase the amount of inorganic nitrogen if 
it were possible without affecting the maximum use of 
organic nitrogen. However, because of the mutual 
interdependency of both nitrogen types and the value of 
the organic nitrogen quota, the optimal level is not applied 
by farmers. This trade-off is significantly influenced by the 
organic nitrogen quota rent. A higher organic nitrogen 
quota rent will favour the use of organic nitrogen. If the 
initially applied level of inorganic nitrogen does not 
compromise the maximum allowable use of organic 
nitrogen, nothing will change.  
This observed behaviour will influence  policies’ 
effectiveness. The Nitrate directive, for example, reduces 
the organic nitrogen quota. Based on our results, more 
stringent quota for organic nitrogen then cause a shift to a 
higher utilisation of inorganic nitrogen at farm level when 
the quota of total nitrogen or inorganic nitrogen is not 
adapted accordingly. As long as the optimal level of 
inorganic nitrogen has not been reached, a one-side 
reduction of the organic nitrogen quota will therefore be 
ineffective but also inefficient because of the increased 
manure disposal costs for the farmers.  
Given this trade-off behaviour of farmers, new policy 
options have to be sought. The farmer’s sensitivity to 
quota rent tempts to increase the quota rent which will lead 
to a higher utilisation of organic nitrogen. Especially 
deficit farms will accept more organic nitrogen when quota 
rent increases. Quota rent for deficit farms increases when 
transaction costs decreases. Lower transaction costs can 
lead to an upward shift in demand and supply curve of 
emission rights resulting in a higher utilisation of these 
rights. Lowering transactions costs can e.g. be achieved by 
creating an electronic forum to link demanders and 
suppliers of emission rights or by lowering transport costs.  
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